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Abstract 
 
Conway and Kochen’s Free Will Theorem is examined as an important 
foundational element within a new area of activity within computer 
science – developing protocols for quantum computing. 
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A few weeks before Christmas I went to listen to John Conway speak at 
the Isaac Newton Institute in Cambridge. The late afternoon talk took 
the form of a question and answer session moderated by Siobhan 
Roberts, who is Conway's biographer ( "Genius at Play - The curious 
mind of John Horton Conway" ). The initial invitations looked 
suspiciously like a book promotion (the biography noted above had only 
recently been published), but Conway has such a deep, committed and 
broad following among the Cambridge mathematics community that the 
event very quickly started to be touted as a seminar, and the large 
crowd that showed up meant that is was soon standing room only with 
the back walls pretty much two deep. The audience ranged from ex-
colleagues and long-standing friends and collaborators of Conway, to a 
much bigger contingent of younger mathematicians and physicists for 
whom Conway was a largely mythical figure. Thankfully the book 
promotion part of the event was soon dispensed with, and I am sure that 
I was not alone in being relieved when Conway rescued his interlocutor 
(Siobhan Roberts) from being embarrassed by a rather banal q+a.  
 
What might easily have become an awkward half hour that people had 
to endure before the promised cocktail party1 very quickly became an 
enjoyable 90 minute seminar that very much lived up to the 
expectations that had drawn the crowd in the first place.  That 
afternoon Conway resembled nothing if not an aging warrior of Greek 
mythology.  
 
Conway, who has made Princeton his home for the past 30 years, is one 
of those very few living mathematicians who need absolutely no 
introduction whatsoever. His iconic Game of Life has inspired a whole 
sector of combinatorial game theory. There are a great many resources 
and literature on his Game of Life, but if you happen not to be familiar 
with the game or this area, then this 1970 Scientific American Article is 
still the best single introduction to an invention that has spawned a 
mini industry in computer science. 
 
The great man was on fine form during the talk, and, not surprisingly, 
admitted to being a little bored by talking about the Game of Life. With a 
not so gentle dig at his biographer, Conway ditched any pretense at 
being a part of an obviously tired and choreographed q+a, and embraced 
his audience by settling down to talk about something 'more serious'. 
The result was a fascinating and at times utterly compelling extempore 
lecture about The Free Will Theorem ("FWT") that Conway developed 
                               
1 It should be noted that the publishers, Bloomsbury did in fact put on a very lovely 
spread for cocktails  
with his long time friend and Princeton colleague, Simon Kochen. 
Published in two parts, initially in 2006, and then again in 2009 (Free 
Will Theorem and Strong Free Will Theorem respectively) it is fair to 
say that Conway and Kochen's papers (I will refer to the joint authors as 
C+K) have provoked a deep, sharp, and long lasting response. With the 
passage of time the positives far outweigh the negatives but its still a 
little jarring to note some of the initial criticisms that were cloaked in 
the sort of language one associates with medieval prosecutors of the 
inquisition as opposed to normally conservative scientists, with some of 
the more trenchant early opposition generally being from physicists. 
And not only physicists (yes they still exist !) who recoil at FWT's 
rejection of the so called 'hidden variables' view of quantum mechanics. 
As we all now know, much of that early opposition has evaporated back 
from whence it came, and C+K's two papers now occupy a position of 
orthodoxy - something that I am sure provides Conway with a great deal 
of guilty pleasure2 ! 
 
As a supplement to Bell's Theorem, and as a very clear successor to The 
Kochen-Specker theorem (itself an extension of Bell's Theorem) FWT's 
core assumptions sit comfortably at the modern heart of thinking 
within the theoretical physics community as it has developed since the 
early to mid 1960's. Conway himself, who readily and very happily 
admits to being an interloper among theoretical physicists (and thereby 
claims some protection behind Kochen who is anything but an 
interloper !) has not been shy of courting some friction in the way that 
he has framed his underlying objectives as being as much influenced by 
Philosophy as by Science. This is a contrived position, and says more 
about Conway's predilection for 'frissance' than it does about the paper. 
The fact is that the mathematical formalism that provides the essential 
scaffolding for the two papers meets the highest of rigorous standards. 
The papers are absolutely not philosophical treatises, and the 2009 
                               
2 for a flavour of that mischievousness readers could do worse than watch some of the 
original Princeton videos of the formal presentation. They are available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ftIllWczf5w 
additions were carried very prominently (rightly so) in the "Notices" of 
the American Mathematical Society. 
 
"Do we really have free will, or, as a few determined folk maintain, 
is it all an illusion? We don’t know, but will prove in this paper that 
if indeed there exist any experimenters with a modicum of free will, 
then elementary particles must have their own share of this 
valuable commodity" 
 
With these opening words in the 2006 paper, Conway and Kochen 
assert, through the course of 2 papers and about 4 years of work, that if 
we (ie human beings) have free will, then so do fundamental particles; 
that our decisions are not determined or influenced by prior conditions 
or prior history to any extent. The assertion, developed through three 
basic axioms - "fin" "spin" and "twin" initially appears to skirt with, but 
ultimately avoids anything remotely recursive. The three axioms that 
C+K detail in 2006 are updated in 2009: 
 
Spin - particles have the 101 property (as per Kochen Specker) 
 
Twin - assuming spin above, 2 particles possess total angular 
momentum of 0 (zero) and if the angular momentum of one particle is 
measured as a, then the angular momentum of the other particle is -a 
(minus a) 
 
Fin - this 2006 axiom which reflects the speed of light as the upper 
bound for any velocity for the transmission of information is replaced in 
2009 by Min - where the two experimenters are space-like separated 
and both A and B can equally be 'first' in observing or measuring their 
states. 
 
From these simple bases the track to a conclusion is straightforward3. 
In the enhanced 2009 paper, C+K reiterate the p(home) and p(away) 
entanglement thought experiment and conclude with the statement: 
 
"The Free Will Theorem thus shows that any such theory, even if it 
involves a stochastic element, must walk the fine line of predicting 
that for certain interactions the wave function collapses to some 
eigen function of the Hamiltonian, without being able to specify 
which eigen function this is" 
 
Any reasonable analysis around FWT and the direct linkages with 
causality in quantum mechanics took the original conversations very 
quickly towards the so-called "open problem" or the free will loop hole in 
Bell's theorem. Given the fact that we now know that large parts of that 
debate have been 'de-fanged' I will skip that part of the conversation. 
For those interested in some of the specific experimental advances 
during the 5 years from FWT 2009 I refer by way of example to 
developments at MIT's astronomy lab is described here. 
 
It might be useful at this stage to pause and consider Free Will as a 
concept and remind ourselves of how to frame a possible definition. 
Martin Gardner (see more on him below) provides as good a summary 
of Free Will as I have come across. He says: 
"Free will is neither fate, nor chance. In some unfathomable way it 
partakes of both". 
 
Many of us of an older vintage (by which I mean more than 40 years 
old) are likely to be drawn, when thinking about any discussion of FWT, 
to the well known 'Newcomb Paradox'. There are many different 
                               
3 It should be noted that in a review article in AMS Notice Goldstein and Tausk have 
suggested that only the probability distribution implied in Min should be independent 
of each other in the case cited of A and B. Kochen is on record as requiring that both 
the probability distribution and the outcome should be independent. I have listed the 
Goldstein et al article in the references below 
descriptions of this well known principle of choice, but one of my 
favourite online versions is part of a video series on 'famous' maths 
problems by Norman Wildberger (link here). If you get a chance I do 
recommend watching it. Wildberger brings a mathematical focus to the 
conversation that is extremely well put together.   
 
Wildberger refers in his video to the same Martin Gardner that I refer to 
above, and of course the quote that I use is from the very same book by 
Gardner that Wildberger reads from. It is "The Colossal Book of 
Mathematics" and the quote that I have taken above is from the 
introduction to the section about Newcomb's Paradox. This is a link to 
this amazing book. Gardner is one of those mathematicians who is 
universally praised by those who knew him or learnt from him. 
Additionally he was a huge influence on a whole generation who read 
his regular column in Scientific American that examined mathematical 
problems in a popular but non-condescending manner. Gardner's book is 
actually a collection of those columns, and it is never very far from my 
desk.  
 
Back now to NWT. I was talking about the Newcomb Paradox and how 
Wildberger creates a very cool little mathematical exposition and then 
solution to the challenge. Wildberger's solution is situated partly in a 
traditional probability and statistical part of the maths universe and 
partly in the mathematical physics that describe expectation values in 
quantum mechanics. His equation representing his 'solution' for the 
paradox is: 
 
P(a) + P(b) ≥ 1 + 1/k 
 
where P(a) is the probability of the Newcomb oracle being correct in her 
'guess' when the chooser chooses option A (ie the larger prize) and P(b) 
is the probability of the Newcomb oracle being correct in her guess 
when the chooser chooses option B (ie both prizes).  "k" is simply the 
result of the amount represented by the money given in the larger prize 
(in the newcomb paradox this is normally described as $1million), 
being divided by the amount guaranteed in the smaller prize ($1000).  
 
If you dont know what Newcomb's Paradox states, and you have not yet 
watched the video, I recommend reading this very short summary. 
 
The undying appeal about Newcomb's Paradox is that pretty much 
anyone who studies the problem ends up believing, and emphatically 
believing, that they are sure of the right answer, that everyone and 
anyone with the opposite view is silly and obviously a few shillings short 
of a pound, and that that the "right" thing to do is obvious. Over a period 
of time research has shown that opinions end up being virtually 50:50 
between those who think that Option A is the ONLY logical and correct 
decision. Equally, there are those (50% in fact) who think that the only 
possible right answer is Option B, and that anyone who thinks 
otherwise.....etc etc 
 
Wildberger's formula is itself a straightforward reduction of what he 
calls "expected value". As the terminology suggests there is a link to the 
approach taken in measuring observables in quantum mechanics, and 
this is necessary not because the paradox is one of quantum mechanics, 
but because it does not specify, with any degree of computational 
accuracy just how reliable the Oracle will be in guessing your choice, 
and pretty much the same mathematical approach that works with 
expectation values in quantum states also works here.  
 
We know (we are told in the rules and guidelines to the paradox) that in 
the overwhelming majority, but not all cases, the Oracle is correct. This 
means that even if the rate of accuracy is 99% there will still be that odd 
occasion when the Oracle is wrong. This uncertainty, meaning we just 
don't know what the accuracy rate is , along with the fact the oracle's 
mind, once made up, cannot be changed (ie you can make your choice at 
the very last minute and it will not affect what the Oracle has already 
decided) has meant that the paradox has been extremely useful in 
highlighting core issues around the problem of free will not merely by 
philosophers, but also physicists and mathematicians. In many ways 
the paradox is a worthy vehicle for such discussions. Even when 
allowing for the fact that a participant in the game will amend her 
actions depending upon how many times she is allowed to play (it 
becomes very easy to choose ONLY the big box if you know you can play 
the game many times), the implications are clear - maybe even when 
you think you are making a free choice, you are not actually free of 
some degree of causality. Or so we think !  
 
I should point out at this stage that the degree of uncertainty that is 
embedded in the Newcomb Paradox ought not to be taken as an 
analogue of quantum entanglement. In any truly entangled state we can 
know all there is to know about a system without knowing anything 
about the individual state of a particle within the entangled system. The 
analogy between uncertainty and knowledge (of the oracle and by the 
oracle) in Newcomb's paradox, and quantum entanglement is a slippery 
path if taken very far. FWT is not a riff on entangled states. As we shall 
see the proof of FWT does indeed utilise the laws of quantum physics as 
they relate to uncertainty and entanglement, but the debate around free 
will and the different references that are made to Newcomb when 
talking about free will stop short of making any judgements about those 
links. 
 
Two important formal pieces of work on Free Will that appeared in the 
aftermath of C+K's work do however raise the linkage between Free Will 
and quantum mechanics and computing in a much more credible 
manner, and one of the papers actually makes ample use and reference 
to Newcomb's Paradox. I refer to Seth Lloyd's entertaining and 
engrossing scholarly work "A Turing Test for Free Will" (2013) and 
Scott Aaronson's equally engaging lecture on Free Will (2014) that is 
also included as a later chapter in his book "Quantum Computing since 
Democritus". 
 
Both Seth Lloyd and Scott Aaronson have the incomparable advantage 
of having an interest and expertise in quantum mechanics and quantum 
computing - the two areas that are of greatest interest to me when 
considering C+K's FWT. Lloyd's approach to the subject is to neither 
argue in favour or against Free Will, but to arrive at the conclusion that 
we all (that is we human beings) tend towards a position where we can't 
know or have any knowledge about our own personal decisions more 
fully than the point at which the decisions are actually made. In other 
words even if we try to anticipate our own decisions, we will fail.  
 
The only thing we can do is to actually make those decisions, not try and 
pre-form them. His paper is based on a Turing Test that proves this 
point. 
 
"The inscrutable nature of our choices when we exercise free will is 
a close analogue of the halting problem: once we set a train of 
thought in motion, we do not know whether it will lead anywhere at 
all. Even if it does lead somewhere, we do not know where that 
somewhere is until we get there. Ironically, it is customary to assign 
our own unpredictable behaviour and that of others to irrationality: 
were we to behave rationally, we reason, the world would be more 
predictable. In fact, it is just when we behave rationally, moving 
logically like a computer from step to step, that our behaviour 
becomes provably unpredictable. Rationality combines with the 
capacity of self-reference to make our actions intrinsically 
paradoxical and uncertain" 
 
The Halting problem and Turing's development of Godel's 
incompleteness theorem have long been a final destination or stopping 
point for mathematicians (and that tiny handful of philosophers who 
are equipped to do understand Turing or Godel's formalism) that have 
considered the problem of Free Will from a classical point of view. I 
mean by the use of the word 'classical' that they have avoided the 
uncertainty inherent in quantum physics and use an approach that is 
clearly traditional, hence 'classical', but not random. 
In fact Lloyd (and Aaronson) dispenses very quickly with the concept of 
randomness (and in doing so they align themselves clearly with C+K) in 
order to develop a more rigorous construction for exhibiting a pre-
disposition for Free Will.  
 
Aaronson's step by step defusing of the case for randomness as a by 
product of the Newcomb paradox is actually clearer than C+K's 
approach (I will speak more on that below).  In the case of Lloyd 
however, the Turing Test that he designs, allows individuals to inhabit 
the duality of accepting a deterministic universe, but one where we are 
individually convinced of our free will. His paper, in his own words sets 
out to:  
 
"show that any Turing simulatable decision-making process leads us 
to intrinsically unpredictable decisions, even if the underlying 
process is completely deterministic". 
 
Ultimately Lloyd's position is that it would take a deterministic protocol 
longer to "determine" the decisions about to be taken by a "decider" than 
it takes for a decider to make her decision. Moreover it takes longer 
(and is more complicated) for us to try and decide our own decisions 
ahead of them being made, leading to the strongly held view that we all 
believe in our power of free will and we believe we are endowed with at 
least some element of freedom. Lloyd stops short of expressing a 
personal decision on the matter, and in my view that is the only real 
criticism that can be leveled at the paper since the whole structure and 
approach that he adopts seems to imply a stance in favour of C+K's FWT. 
If that is the case, then why not simply acknowledge the fact ? 
 
Aaronson is less shy, and, as one might expect, far more directly 
emphatic in stating his opinion that Free Will is the axiomatic tenet of a 
universe in the post Bell's experimental era. Aaronson takes the results 
of the Kochen Specker theorem and also C+K's FWT, as merely useful 
extensions and confirmations of Bell, rather than separate or stand 
alone theorems4. He takes pretty much the same view as Wildberger in 
consigning Newcomb's paradox into being a challenge that ultimately 
says very little about Free Will. Where Wildberger then proves his point 
by 'solving' the paradox, Aaronson develops the view that Newcomb's 
paradox is not really very challenging once one assumes that one has 
free will, and the idea that the Oracle of supreme being who knows your 
decision can influence your decision in a directly causal or deterministic 
manner is untenable. Aaronson does not arrive at this decision with an 
explicit formula as Wildberger did, but gets to the same destination by 
careful deduction: 
 
"One reason I like this Newcomb's Paradox is that it gets at a 
connection between "free will" and the inability to predict future 
behavior. Inability to predict the future behavior of an entity 
doesn't seem sufficient for free will, but it does seem somehow 
necessary. If we had some box, and if without looking inside this 
box, we could predict what the box was going to output, then we 
would probably agree among ourselves that the box doesn't have free 
will". 
 
As we have seen, in contrast to Aaronson, Seth Lloyd stops at this point 
of the debate, choosing to expand upon his self designed "Turing test".  
Aaronson however pushes on beyond this initial boundary and 
                               
4 In neither of C+K’s two papers, 2006 or 2009 do they address Von Neumann’s view of 
dispersion free states, but it is my view that Bell’s rather peremptory dismissal of Von 
Neumann in this context and subsequent work have dispensed with any requirement 
to comment on this related issue. Bell’s collection of essays “Speakable and 
Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics” contains a thorough review of this topic. 
addresses C+K directly. Reading the Aaronson paper akin to the 
experience of realising that the summit we have just climbed is a false 
peak, and the real trophy lies further ahead. There is still some hard 
climbing to do. I am reminded of Piet Hein's quaint rhyme: 
 
"A bit beyond perception's reach/I sometimes believe I see/That life 
is two locked boxes, each/Containing the other's key" 
 
As I note above, Aaronson appears to place C+K as merely another 
confirmation of Bell's theorem and therefore similar to the Kochen-
Speker Theorem. Interestingly however, Aaronson's articulation of 
C+K's initial assumptions provide a sort of ground state for the FWT.  
 
These assumptions are: the freedom to choose a quantum state; the 
ability to perform experiments on the Alice and Bob states in separate 
spacetime frames such that both Alice and Bob could be "first'; and 
finally that information cannot travel quicker than lightspeed. 
 
Aaronson arrives at his conclusion: 
 
"The measurement outcomes can't have been determined in 
advance, even probabilistically; the universe must "make them up 
on the fly" after seeing how Alice and Bob set their detectors". 
 
Shortly after I was a member of the audience for Conway's memorable 
talk in Cambridge, I travelled over to the west coast and spent some 
time with the Artificial Intelligence team within Google at their 
headquarters just off Venice Beach in LA. Like all who visit that facility, 
I am constrained by an NDA in talking about what is going on. However 
in their bid to establish "Quantum Supremacy" the team, led by Hartmut 
Neven, talks not in terms of decades but in a timetable that is the 
technology equivalent of tomorrow. For the avoidance of doubt, the 
"tomorrow" that I refer to is the timeline for building and operating a 
universal quantum computer. What is utterly fascinating is that 
whether we examine Google's efforts, or those of other combatants in 
the race such as Microsoft or IBM, a C+K type articulation and view of 
Free Will represents the basis upon which most of the departures from 
classical computing are being designed. 
 
In the short time since the publication of the second FWT paper in 2009, 
the fundamental assumptions that C+K established in their paper have 
already been utilised in what I would describe as a 'real world' and 
commercial problem. And of course we all know that during the early 
part of this period (ie from about 2009 until about the middle of 2014), 
progress towards building a quantum computer had yet to really heat 
up. That period that might be described as 'heating up" did not start 
until the middle of 2014 when engineering advances started to be used 
by large organisations with the budget and the infrastructural resource 
to build and maintain long term programmes. The engineering advances 
I refer to by way of example, are the same ones that have led to 
progress at the Large Hedron Collider, and more recently to the ground 
breaking experiments at LIGO (gravitational waves of course !). 
 
More specifically, the use of FWT related precepts from C+K's paper that 
I refer to, is the use in quantum information science of randomness5 
generators to deliver something called an Einstein Certified random 
number ("ECR number). In its simplest form an ECR number carries 
with it the guarantee that is absolutely random. Short of faster than 
light travel or some form of spooky time travel, an ECR number is about 
as certainly random as we could possibly devise, and for all kinds of 
commercial reasons any protocols that can be adapted for quantum 
computers in this area will be of very great importance. 
 
                               
5 Tumulka 2006 comments meaningfully on randomness. In a paper that is otherwise 
trenchantly hostile to C+K the short section on randomness is very good as it contains 
a useful exposition of the views of C+K in consigning stochastic processes as ultimately 
deterministic  
In his book "Quantum Computing since Democritus" Aaronson very 
briefly picks up on this development and explains how Bells and C+K's 
Alice and Bob experiments on entangled particles result in a true rolling 
of the dice "on the fly". It is that last statement that brings to the fore 
the importance of Free Will in Quantum Information Sciences.  
 
As regular readers of my occasional articles will know, I have been 
rather more optimistic about the emergence of a truly quantum 
computational processor than most, and within the very narrow 
confines of working out how we might usefully benefit from such 
machines, (narrow in the sense that I don't think we will get to grips 
with the question until there are real machines accessible to more than 
a handful of theoretical physicists hidden away in large corporates or 
government defence and security funded programmes), true 
randomness has very quickly become very important. 
 
For those interested in looking a little more deeply at the subject, my 
favourite practical paper on the subject of random number generation is 
one that I have only recently encountered, though it was written in the 
tail end of 2013 (and therefore published after Aaronson's book). 
Written by a clutch of researchers, (link here to arxiv source) the paper 
covers ground that provides a concrete setting for precisely those 
aspects of C+K's FWT that matter the most. The abstract to the paper 
concludes with the comment: 
 
" The protocol involves four devices, can amplify any non-
deterministic source into a fully random source, tolerates a constant 
rate of error, and has its correctness based solely on the assumption 
of no-signaling between the devices". 
 
A little later, in the main body of the paper the authors state: 
 
"The existence of non-local quantum correlations violating Bell 
inequalities already suggests that device-independent randomness 
amplification could be achieved. However, the violation of Bell 
inequalities requires that the measurements be performed in a 
random manner, independent of the system upon which they are 
performed". 
 
Sound familiar ? Where have we heard that phrase before ?  
That 'modicum of free will' that C+K assume in FWT is the foundation 
from which this attempt at true randomness is being generated. 
 
In Aaronson's book on Quantum Computing, he creates a basis for a 
class of problems that can be efficiently solved using a quantum as 
opposed to a classical computer. You will recall that BPP or the Bounded 
Error Probabilistic Polynomial Time class of problems refers to those 
problems that are capable of being solved on a classical computer. The 
class of problems that can be solved using a Quantum Computer is 
known as BQP or Bounded Error Quantum Polynomial Time problems.  
 
When defining the parameters that will contain such problems, 
Aaronson (and others) identify 4 items or qualities that need to be 
present. 1) Initialization; 2) Transformations; 3) Measurement; and 4) 
Uniformity. The first three, viz initialization (initialized states or 
qubits), transformations (the state of superposition essential for any 
operators to be effected), and measurement (normalised observables) 
can be simulated but not perfected unless one assumes that Bell's 
theorem works all the time, everytime and everywhere, and therefore 
that all particles (qubits) are endowed with Free Will. Note, Free Will, 
and not mere randomness. 
 
C+K may not have anticipated this particular direction of travel for 
their work from over 10 years ago. Their thought experiment, posited 
as FWT, is now a core principle that could, in my view, drive the 
utilisation of whatever power quantum computing is going to provide to 
its users, and the same basis (for example) that provides true 
randomness will also provide true quantum effectiveness. When 
Feynman and others talked about quantum computers finally bringing 
us to the point where we can compute using nature's own methods, they 
assumed not only that quantum entanglement works (after all it is 
experimentally one of the most successful of modern theories), but that 
the results are neither deterministic nor random. 
 
 
Further references: 
 
Aaronson, S (2013) Quantum Computing since Democritus. (Cambridge 
University Press) 
 
Bassi, A., Ghirardi, G.C. (2007). The Conway-Kochen Argument and 
Relativistic GRW Models. (Foundations of Physics 37, 167-185) 
 
Bell, J.S. (1964). On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen Paradox. (Physics 1, 195-
200) 
 
Bell, J.S. (2004) Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics second 
edition (Cambridge University Press pp 4) 
 
Brown, H., Svetlichny, G. (1990). Nonlocality and Gleason's lemma. Part I. 
Deterministic theories (Foundations of Physics 20, 1379-1388) 
 
Cator, E., Landsman, K. (2014). Constraints on determinism: Bell versus 
Conway-Kochen (Foundations of Physics 44, 781-791) 
 
Conway, J.H., Kochen, S. (2006). The Free Will Theorem  (Foundations of 
Physics 36, 1441-1473) 
 
Conway, J.H., Kochen, S. (2009). The Strong Free Will Theorem (Notices of the 
American Mathematical Society 56, 226-232) 
 
Einstein, A., Podolsky, B., Rosen, N. (1935) Can quantum-mechanical 
description of physical reality be considered complete? (Physical Review 47) 
 
Gardner, M. (2001) The Colossal Book of Mathematics (WW Norton and Co 
pp580-588) 
 
Goldstein, S., Tausk, D.V., Tumulka, R., Zanghi, N. (2010). What does the free 
will theorem actually prove? (Notices of the AMS December 2010, 1451-
1453) 
 
Heywood, P., Redhead, M. (1983). Nonlocality and the Kochen-Specker 
paradox (Foundations of Physics 13, 487-499) 
 
J. P. Jarrett (1984) On the physical significance of the locality conditions in 
the Bell arguments (Nous 18(4)) 
 
Lloyd, S. (2012) A Turing Test for Free Will (Royal Society DOI: 10.1098) 
 
`t Hooft, G. (2007) Free-Will Postulate in Quantum Mechanics (arXiv:quant-
ph/0701097) 
 
Nearing, J (2003) Mathematical Tools for Physics (Courier pp158-160)  
 
Price, H. (1996) Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point: New Directions for the 
Physics of Time (Oxford University Press) 
 
Roberts, S. (2015) Genius at Play: The Curious Mind of John Horton Conway 
(Bloomsbury) 
 
Tumulka, R (2006) Comment on the Free Will Theorem (arxiv quant-
ph/0611283)
 
 
